Government-opposition dynamics during the economic crisis in Greece by Gemenis, Kostas & Nezi, Roula
Government-opposition dynamics during the
economic crisis in Greece∗
Kostas Gemenis Roula Nezi
September 13, 2012
Abstract
The paper examines the turbulent period of 2010–2012 when Greece
became the first EU member-state to accept the IMF/EU bailout
package. Unarguably, accepting the bailout package did not have only
economic but also electoral consequences as the established party sys-
tem has been steadily disintegrating. We focus on the relationship be-
tween government and opposition parties and MPs in the legislature
and we examine their voting behaviour during key economic bills dur-
ing this period. We find that their behaviour can be explained less by
consensus-building and more by strategic considerations. Moreover,
even though the economic crisis seems to have decreased polarization
on the traditional left-right dimension, a new conflict dimension over
the bailout package seems to have emerged. Taken together, these
events can explain both the lack of consensus observed in other South-
ern European countries as well as the changes in the party system.
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1 Introduction
When George Papandreou, leader of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PA-
SOK) was elected as a prime minister in October 2009, few would expect
what would follow. Even though the consequences of the global financial
crisis were looming large for Greece already since the June 2009 election to
the European Parliament, Papandreou’s promise of a 3 billion euro stimulus
package for the economy implied that the country could continue into the
crisis going with business as usual (Gemenis 2010, 360). These prospects
were quickly abandoned, however, when the PASOK government quickly re-
alized that the country’s debt was out of control and negotiated a bailout
package with what was dubbed as ‘the troika’, namely the representatives
of the European Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB), and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). In this conjuncture, the opposition par-
ties were faced with a dilemma. To either support the government’s decision
and attempt to build a wider consensus around implementing the reforms
mandated by the lenders, or oppose the government hoping that they would
be able to benefit electorally from the disaffection which would surely en-
sue and, potentially, win the next election and advance an alternative eco-
nomic strategy. Unarguably, for the parties which vehemently opposed the
(neo-)liberal economic policies of the troika or lamented the loss of national
sovereignty associated with such international agreements, this was a false
dilemma. For such parties, opposition to the government was the only legit-
imate option although the repertoires of political action differed from party
to party. The real dilemma rested with the opposition parties which were not
very far from the government with regard to issues of economic policy. Even
though opposition parties made clear cut decisions in other Southern Euro-
pean countries also affected by the economic crisis, with opposition parties
challenging governments and subsequently winning elections in Spain and
Portugal, or supporting a wider coalition government of technocrats in Italy,
their behaviour in Greece was erratic and characterized by discontinuity.
The aim of this paper is to examine this discontinuity. In order to do so,
we focus on the parliamentary votes in three key bills: the first agreement
with the troika dubbed the ‘memorandum’ (May 2010), the midterm fiscal
plan (June 2011), and the second memorandum with the troika (February
2012) which are the most important pieces of economic legislation under the
examine period but which also exhibit a high degree of discontinuity in vot-
ing instructions issued by the parties. We argue that party behaviour can
be understood if one sees voting instructions as being mandated not by the
parties long-standing ideological positions but by short-term strategic con-
siderations which are updated on the basis of public opinion, international
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events and the strategies of the other parties in the party system. We there-
fore structure the paper as follows. In the following section we give a brief
overview of the context which the Greek party system has been operating
since 1981. The remaining sections we outline the main strategy of each of the
parliamentary parties regarding each of the three aforementioned bills. We
conclude that these short-term party strategies did little to improve Greece’s
economic standing during the last two years, but have effectively challenged
the existing party system in a way which will have important consequences
for the future.
2 A ‘cartel’ party system
Since 1981, and up to the period examined in this paper, the Greek party
system has been characterized by the dominance of two parties which have
been alternating in power as well as a smaller pole consisting of parties of
the left (Pappas 2003). Like many other parliamentary democracies in West-
ern Europe, the two major parties, were initially created on the premise of
competing at the opposing sides of a left-right dimension defined by issues
around morality and income redistribution. PASOK was founded in 1974
and, in many respects, exemplified the programmatic trajectories of social-
democratic parties in Europe, while New Democracy (ND) founded the same
year followed a similar route to many conservative (and sometimes) Chris-
tian democratic parties. In addition to the Western European experience,
however, PASOK did not only rely to its ideology to win elections during the
1980s. As the party did not have a long or consolidated relationship with
the trade unions which traditionally formed the backbone of social demo-
cratic parties in Western Europe, PASOK increasingly relied on polarizing
discourse, populism and patronage to establish itself electorally as well as tar-
get floating voters (Kalyvas 1997, Mavrogordatos 1997, Pappas 2010). Par-
tially in response to PASOK’s strategies and partially in response to demands
within its own constituencies, the strategy of ND with regards to patronage
has been largely similar (Close 2009, Pappas & Assimakopoulou 2012). Cou-
pled with the fact that the post-Maastricht era after 1992 unarguably limited
the governing parties’ space for manoeuvring their economic (and to less ex-
tent their social) policies, these developments led to a blurring of ideological
boundaries between the two parties.
In many respects, the two major Greek parties came to exemplify what
Katz and Mair (1995) called ‘cartel’ parties. More accurately, the Greek
party system could be characterized as a cartel party system (Koole 1996) in
which its constituent parties PASOK and ND have been increasingly relying
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on state funding, media regulation, and manipulation of the electoral system
to secure access to office. For instance, parties in office do not only control the
state media, but have also regulated the private market in such a way which
makes it dependent to political patronage (Papatheodorou & Machin 2003).
Moreover, Greece probably holds the record among consolidated democracies
in terms of electoral law changes (Golder 2005) as PASOK and ND have
been often tailoring the electoral system to suit their needs. For instance,
when PASOK realized that changing the electoral system to prevent ND
from forming a government, it collaborated with the left parties to change
the system to proportional representation. ND was then forced to form
an, essentially, caretaker coalition with the left and when it later secured
a parliamentary majority, changed the system to the less proportional and
introduced a 3% threshold for parliamentary representation in 1993. Most
recently, PASOK introduced a 40 (out of 300) seat bonus to the first party,
which was quickly changed to 50 when ND won the next election (Gemenis
2008, 95–96, 100).
These developments combined led to a situation where the mainstream
‘cartel’ political parties were characterized by strong discipline but weak ide-
ological cohesion. Although these two features might sound contradictory,
in practice they were complementary and actually fed into each other. The
weak ideological cohesion was partially due to the effects of globalization and
European integration as argued above, but also due to the strategy of the
two parties to capture power by attracting candidates not on the basis of
their ideological compactness but on their basis of the size of their political
clientele (Pappas 2009). For instance, the strategy of ND to absorb many
cadres of the extreme right after the 1977 election, contributed not only to
the virtual extinction of the extreme right until the late 1990s, but also to
the formation of a visible faction within ND which was often at odds with
the centrist party leadership (Pappas & Dinas 2006). At the same time the
changes in the electoral system effectively hampered the ability of dissenting
MPs to form successful splinter parties. All attempts to form splinter par-
ties since 1981 were either stillborn or, at best, would not make it over the
3% threshold for more than two consequent legislative periods.1 It became
1The most prominent examples are: Democratic Renewal, a 1985 ND splinter which
got one seat in each of the June 1989 and April 1990 elections and disbanded after failing
to pass the 3% threshold in the 1994 election to the European Parliament. Political Spring
was a 1993 ND splinter that earned 10 seats in the 1993 election. It failed to pass the
threshold in the following parliamentary election and later disbanded with its president
rejoining ND. Democratic Social Movement was a 1996 PASOK splinter which earned
9 seats in the 1996 election but failed to pass the threshold in the following election.
Although the leader claimed to have disbanded the party, many prominent cadres later
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apparent that, if PASOK and ND MPs disagreed with their parties, the only
successful exit solution was to cross the floor to the other major party of the
cartel.2 In turn, this contributed to increasing the ideological heterogeneity
of the cartel parties. Despite the ideological heterogeneity, however, the lack
of electoral prospects outside the major parties meant that ‘loyalty’ was often
less costly than ‘voice’, let alone ‘exit’. As a result, as Sotiropoulos (2012)
notes, the Greek parliament is characterized by ‘the tradition of strong dis-
cipline, resulting in the expulsion of dissidents by fiat of the party leadership
[. . . ] while bills of law are rarely if ever rejected by the parliament’. Based
on the above we can formulate the following hypothesis regarding the parlia-
mentary voting instructions given by parties in Greece:
Hypothesis: Support for government bills will more likely come from parties
positioned towards the centre, rather the extremes, of a general left-right
dimension of political competition.
As argued, voting behaviour in parliamentary voting is bounded by the par-
ties’ general ideological positions. Parties (on the left) which oppose the
(neo-)liberal direction of the economic measures are less likely to support
the bill brought by the government. In addition, parties (on the right) which
oppose the loss of sovereignty with regards to policy-making which is asso-
ciated with international agreements will also be less likely to support the
bill. In essence, the hypothesis revisits the ‘inverted U’ hypothesis between
party positions on the left-right dimension and party positions on the Euro-
pean integration dimension (Hooghe, Marks & Wilson 2002). In addition, we
make the following propositions with regards to the strategic considerations
of parties:
joined the Coalition of the Radical Left under the party label. The Popular Orthodox
Rally (LAOS) began as a ND splinter in 2000 and managed to elect 10 MPs in 2007
and 15 in 2009 although it fell short of the 3% threshold during the May and June 2012
elections. Most of its cadres have since defected to ND.
2Two prominent examples: Stelios Papathemelis a veteran PASOK MP and minister
founded Democratic Revival in 2004 only to suspend it a few months later and run under
a ND ticket. After he was elected he resigned the ND whip and became an independent.
When he contested the 2007 election with his own party, however, he got only 0.8% of
the vote. Stefanos Manos a veteran ND MP and minister founded ‘The Liberals’ in 1999
only to suspend it a few months later and run under a ND ticket. After he was elected
he resigned the ND and became an independent. ‘The Liberals’ were disbanded in 2001
citing funding problems and the Manos run the 2004 election under a PASOK ticket. Once
again, he became an independent when elected after resigning the PASOK whip. He later
found another liberal party Drassi in 2009 which nevertheless got only 1.8% of the vote
in May 2012 (in an electoral alliance with another liberal party).
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Proposition 1: Parties will consider their decision to support or oppose gov-
ernment bills in light of their more general party goals.
Parties which are primarily vote-seeing will be more likely to oppose gov-
ernment bills if public opinion on the matter appears to be overwhelmingly
against the bills. Conversely, office-seeking parties will be less likely to con-
sider public opinion as something which needs to be factored in their decisions
if support for the bills would be associated with the possibility of attaining
cabinet portfolios. Policy-seeking parties, however, will be less likely to fac-
tor in public opinion or cabinet portfolios but more likely to factor in the
possibility of being able to influence the policies associated with the bill.
Proposition 2: Parties will consider their decision to support or oppose gov-
ernment bills in light of the degree of ideological cohesion and party discipline.
Internally divided parties in the opposition are less likely to make controver-
sial decisions in supporting a bill proposed by the government which could
lead to fissures in the party organization or the parliamentary caucus. This
can be particularly important among parties in which party discipline is less
strong or among parties which value internal democracy.
3 The vote on the memorandum of under-
standing, May 2010
Approximately one month after the 2009 election, officials in the PASOK
government realized that the budget deficit would be nine points higher than
originally expected. This meant that PASOK had to abandon its ambitious
plans for a stimulus package, but also that it had to come up with a short-
term solution since the country’s bonds were quickly downgraded to ‘junk’
status. Papandreou, having quickly dismissed the option of an outright de-
fault, rallied for the creation of a support mechanism within the EU which
would offer a bailout package in order to secure the necessary liquidity on the
promise of swift reforms (Gemenis 2010, 360–361). Even if the Greek gov-
ernment was, at the time, making promises which could not swiftly deliver,
the European assessment of the problem was miscalculated and its response
rather slow (Tsarouhas 2012, 92–93). The IMF and EU partners were mis-
taken to think that Greece’s debt could be managed solely by implementing
reforms and without a radical restructuring. As a consequence, the memoran-
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dum of understanding with the ‘troika’ which was brought to the parliament
was seen as a desperate act. For policy-seeking parties there was no chance
of debating, let alone changing, the substance of the submitted bill. In this
‘take it or leave it’ situation, those who thought that Papandreou had done
a bad job in the negotiations were more than likely to vote against the bill.
Even those who did not consider liberal reforms as completely undesirable,
were left to wonder how the policy proposals would work out in a socie´te´
bloque´e, a society which vehemently opposed reforms (Featherstone 2005).
Nevertheless, the realists among the latter would acknowledge that, even if
the measures were poorly formulated or unlikely to be implemented, voting in
favour of the bill would be necessary to ensure short-term financial liquidity
and the presence of the country in the Eurozone.
Voting for the memorandum therefore exhibited a peculiar set of accords.
Out of the 159 PASOK MP’s present, 156 voted according to the party line,
and three abstained. ND opposed the memorandum, with the exception of
Dora Bakoyiannis who voted in favour and was subsequently expelled from
the party. The Communist Party of Greece (KKE) and the Coalition of Rad-
ical Left (SYRIZA) voted against, while the radical right Popular Orthodox
Rally (LAOS) aligned with the government in voting in favour. The three
PASOK MPs who abstained were quickly expelled from the parliamentary
caucus and the party for not following the party whip. All three, were known
to have been to the left wing of the party, seeing quite critically the ideo-
logical trajectory of the party after Costas Simitis had taken over the party
leadership in 1996.
If the behaviour of these three MPs was ideologically motivated, one can-
not conclude entirely the same for the voting instructions issued by ND.
Ideologically, ND was far from the social democratic traditions of opposi-
tion to (neo-)liberal reforms. Nevertheless, the new leader Antonis Samaras,
who emerged in after the 2009 defeat was know for his nationalist stances
in foreign policy issues. Samaras a ND MP since 1977, resigned the party
whip in 1993 when he disagreed with prime minister Konstantinos Mitso-
takis over the issue of the naming the neighbouring republic as ‘Macedonia’
(Featherstone 1994). His resignation, along with a few fellow MPs, not only
brought the ND government down but also contributed to the 1993 election
defeat as he founded a splinter party called Political Spring (POLAN). The
latter was unsuccessful in the long run and Samaras was eventually slowly
re-integrated into ND through a series of political appointments. As the
memorandum was not associated with feelings of national pride, and Sama-
ras had the reputation of someone who feels strongly about ‘national’ issues,
it would make sense to oppose the bill. This explanation, however, disre-
gards the fact that, although many ND MPs exhibited similar attitudes with
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regard to issues of national identity (Nezi, Sotiropoulos & Toka 2010), such
views were not shared among those with a liberal background, including
Bakoyannis who was Samaras’ opponent in his November 2009 bid for party
leadership. Samaras’ must have felt that if Bakoyannis would have voted
against the party line, it would be unlikely that she could have been able to
draw other liberal-minded MPs with her. Perhaps sensing that Bakoyannis
open disagreement with the party line had more to do with an ongoing per-
sonal feud rather than a deep rift in the party, he found it preferable to use
the party whip as an opportunity consolidate his leadership within the party
and sacrifice a dissenting MP in the process.
To this, we should add an important strategic consideration. In Octo-
ber 2009, ND suffered its worse defeat in parliamentary elections since 1974,
while for the first couple of months in 2010 the opinion polls were still giving
a considerable lead for PASOK (Gemenis 2012, 109). Perhaps considering
that, in times of economic downturns, retrospective evaluations about the
economy are expected to hurt the incumbent parties more than the chal-
lengers (Nezi 2012), Samaras might have considered that staying firmly in
the opposition might have been a sensible thing to do. Nevertheless, since
ND is an office-seeking party within the aforementioned cartel, Samaras must
have realized that his party would eventually come to deal with similar policy
dilemmas as an incumbent. In thinking so, Samaras carefully orchestrated
his opposition to the bill in terms of arguing that the memorandum was un-
necessarily humiliating and presented a plan (dubbed ‘Zappeio’) where he
outlined what his party considered as an alternative way out of the debt
crisis.
Table 1: Voting patterns on the memorandum, May 2010.
Yes No Abstain Not present
PASOK 156 0 3 1
ND 1 89 0 1
SYRIZA 0 12 0 1
KKE 0 20 0 1
LAOS 15 0 0 0
Total 172 121 3 4
One would expect that the voting instructions of LAOS would have
mimicked the ones given in ND. If anything, LAOS was considerably more
Eurosceptic compared to ND (Verney 2011) and had a tendency to ad-
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vance conspiracy theories regarding ‘foreign interests’ and ‘enemies of Greece’
(Gemenis & Dinas 2010, 190). Opposing the bill would easily fit into the
party’s ideological trajectory so the explanation of the affirmative vote should
examine the party’s goals. Even though LAOS can be primarily character-
ized as a vote-seeking party as maintaining electoral results above the 3% is
necessary for its survival, the party often exhibited office-seeking tendencies.
Its leader Georgios Karatzaferis had twice previously offered his support to
ND, once for forming a coalition in the event that the 2007 election would
not produce a majority for ND (Gemenis 2008, 97), and once for joining the
government in the summer of 2009 when the opinion polls were indicating
that support for ND was evaporating. Both proposals were rebuffed by the
former ND leader Karamanlis who followed a centripetal ideological trajec-
tory, so Karatzaferis argued that his party acted responsibly hoping to use
his actions as a bridge between PASOK and ND. Finally, as expected, both
KKE and SYRIZA voted against the memorandum since they were staunch
opponents of both the idea of a bailout plan as well as the reforms proposed
therein.
4 The 2010 regional elections, November 2010
The vote on the memorandum was followed by an important development
within Synaspismos (SYN), the largest constituent party of the SYRIZA
coalition. In the party’s June 2010 congress, most of the prominent members
of the pro-European integration Ananeotiki faction walked out of the congress
and announced their intention to form a new political party. The dissenters
opposed SYN’s proposal to transform the SYRIZA coalition into a party as
they felt that they would be further marginalized within SYRIZA, a coalition
consisting primarily of parties and activists who oppose European integration
as evidenced in the struggle over the list for the 2009 EP election (Gemenis
2010, 355). The issue of European integration was particularly important
for Ananeotiki cadres who felt that SYN was compromising the party’s long-
standing Europeanism. The new splinter party, named Democratic Left, was
founded on June 27 and it included four MPs who defected from the SYRIZA
parliamentary caucus.
This was an important development in many respects. On the one hand, it
gave the impression that, despite the fact that the PASOK government was
becoming increasingly unpopular in the opinion polls due to the austerity
measures which were being implemented, the opposition parties were unable
to form an effective opposition to these measures. Beside LAOS which had
voted in favour of the memorandum, ND had not yet recovered from the
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2009 defeat and the left seemed in disarray. On the other hand, however, the
presence of a moderate Europeanist party in the ideological space between
PASOK and SYRIZA could open the door for defections among dissenting
PASOK MPs and, perhaps also, disgruntled PASOK voters.
The next test for the government were the regional elections which were
scheduled for November. The contest featured elections for mayors as well the
newly instituted direct election of the 13 regional governors, an office with
high visibility but minimal impact on policy-making (Gemenis 2012, 107–
108). Although local and regional elections are traditionally see as second-
order elections in Greece as much everywhere else, the government feared that
the opposition could effectively transform them into an ‘anti-government’ and
‘anti-memorandum’ struggle. Since the Greek constitution prohibits parties
from participating in local and regional elections, the latter take place by
creating seemingly independent lists which are nevertheless openly endorsed
by parties (Gemenis 2012, 107–108). PASOK therefore feared the creation
of the so-called ‘rebel’ lists which would compete against its own officially
endorsed ones. Indeed, one of the dissenting MPs expelled in May, Alexis
Dimaras, announced that he would contest the most populous Attica region
which includes Athens metropolitan area, while another such list threatened
to split the PASOK vote in the Ionian Islands region. Moreover, ND had to
face some rebels of its own in Crete where a governor candidate was tacitly
supported by Bakoyannis and in the Peloponnese where a former ND MP
was supported jointly by PASOK and LAOS.
The latter followed a strategy of fielding experienced candidates of its
own in some regions, supporting ND candidates in others and a ND rebel
played on the image of a responsible party which avoided the extreme anti-
memorandum overtones and tried to communicate with both PASOK and ND
in order to find a commonly accepted solution for the sake of the national
interest. LAOS, however, found difficult to support in the campaign its
decision to vote in favour of the memorandum and suffered considerable
losses (Gemenis 2012, 112). The left opposition of KKE and SYRIZA fared
considerably well, save a SYRIZA rebel list in Attica headed by its former
leader who had long expressed his dissatisfaction with the present leader
Alexis Tsipras (Gemenis 2010, 356).
The results therefore presented a mixed picture. Although PASOK and
LAOS, which supported the memorandum suffered considerable losses, the
anti-memorandum camp did not exactly triumph either. Dimaras, who
openly campaigned on a ‘anti-memorandum’ manifesto failed to make it to
the second round, the moderate former ND rebels fared well, and so did the
candidates of the moderate SYRIZA splinter Democratic Left. In the end
PASOK managed to control the majority 6 out of 13 regions, while it man-
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aged to control the Athens and Thessaloniki municipal councils after being
controlled by ND for 24 years. This gave the impression that PASOK left
the election relatively unscathed considering the austerity measures that had
been implemented.
5 The vote on the midterm fiscal plan, June
2011
At the immediate aftermath of the 2010 elections Bakoyannis announced that
she would found a new party. The party which was founded on November 21
and named Democratic Alliance served not only as a vehicle for Bakoyannis’
personal ambitions, but also as the latest attempt to create a liberal party
headed by an established politician. Within the next two months, four more
MPs and one MEP crossed the floor and joined Democratic Alliance reduc-
ing therefore the ND parliamentary caucus to 86 members. Within a year,
the memorandum vote has not only challenged the popularity of the govern-
ment and the unity of PASOK, but created visible fissures among the parties
that opposed it. With the exception of KKE, both ND and SYRIZA ex-
perienced the creation of moderate splinters which challenged the strategies
which parties followed up to that moment.
As it seemed that the government might been able to proceed with an-
other round of austerity measures a wave of peaceful protests swept the coun-
try. Even though strikes and protests had become a regular occurrence in
Athens since the announcement of the first austerity measures months before
Greece entered the support mechanism the size of the mobilizations beginning
in May 2011 was unprecedented (Sotiropoulos 2012, 32–33). Prompted by
rumours (which later proved to be entirely unsubstantiated) that the indig-
nados of Madrid have been ridiculing the Greeks for not protesting and being
passive to the austerity measures, the Greek indignados or aganaktismenoi
made their entry in Syntagma square in Athens and the sit-ins quickly spread
to other major cities across Greece. The protests lasted for more than two
months and were largely peaceful until they were overshadowed by a series
of spontaneous unorchestrated verbal and physical attacks against individual
MPs going about their business around the country. 3
3In a study conducted by V. Georgiadou, A. Kafe, Z. Lefkofridi, R. Nezi and C. Pieridis
by means of interviews in a sample of 79 indignados in Syntagma, it was revealed that
27.3% endorsed the attacks against MPs and a further 34.1% declared that they would
not personally engage in such attacks although they do not disagree with the practice (To
Vima, July 22, 2012).
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Table 2: Voting patterns on the midterm fiscal plan, June 2011.
Yes No Abstain Not present
PASOK 154 1 0 0
ND 0 83 0 2
SYRIZA 0 9 0 0
KKE 0 21 0 0
LAOS 0 15 0 0
Dem. Left 0 4 0 0
Dem. Alliance 0 0 5 0
Ind. ex-PASOK 0 3 0 2
Ind. ex-ND 1 0 0 0
Total 155 136 5 4
When the government brought the midterm fiscal plan on a vote in the
parliament on June, it had become clear that support for the government had
virtually evaporated. A cabinet reshuffle on 17 June could not contribute in
changing the climate. Those who saw their quality of life deteriorating from
the repeated cuts in salaries and pensions, the tax hikes, the spiralling un-
employment (especially among young people) and the increase in crime, had
been transformed into angry crowd which threatened to storm the parlia-
ment building. Georgios Lianis a PASOK MP resigned the party whip after
making known that he did not agree with the proposed plan. Considering
another MP who resigned the whip a few months earlier the PASOK parlia-
mentary caucus was reduced to 155 members. Samaras’ continuing his tactics
instructed his 85 MPs to vote against the bill. They all complied apart from
Elsa Papadimitriou who hours before the vote announced her intention to
leave the ND caucus and vote in favour citing the need to avoid the coun-
try’s quick default. Sensing that public opinion had turned violently against
those who supported the memorandum, Bakoyannis and her four Democratic
Alliance MPs decided to abstain, whereas Karatzaferis made a U-turn and
joined the parties of the left which all voted against. With an additional
PASOK MP voting against the party line, the midterm fiscal plan was voted
on a narrow 155 in favour/136 against majority.
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6 The vote on the Papademos coalition gov-
ernment, November 2011
After the vote on the midterm fiscal plan it was apparent that the bills
brought by the government were akin to hot potatoes which none of the
parties in the opposition were willing to support. PASOK suffered tremen-
dously in the opinion polls and so did the parties which had supported or
tolerated the bills in one way or another. The lack of pro-government con-
sensus, however, worried the European leaders. In particular, the fellow
conservative leaders in the European People’s Party expected from Samaras
to show leadership and support the austerity measures that came with the
loans to Greece, for they have been painfully rallying about them back in the
parliaments of their respective countries.
Playing on the responsible leader image, Karatzaferis tried to broker an
agreement between Papandreou and Samaras, to form an extraordinary coali-
tion government of ‘national unity’ which would address the country’s most
pressing problems. His effort, however, was merely an unsuccessful bid for
office which was not taken seriously, at least compared to the neighbour-
ing Italy where a consensus around the formation of a technocratic cabinet.
When another package of austerity measures was brought to the parliament
on October 20, the voting patterns were similar to those of the midterm fiscal
plan a few months earlier, save the fact that another PASOK MP and former
minister, Louka Katseli, who voted against the party line and subsequently
expelled from the parliamentary caucus.
Papandreou then came up with a highly controversial proposal: to bring
Greece’s bailout plan to a popular referendum. Apparently, the idea was
to rally for as much of the opposition’s support possible by thinking that
few would like to be responsible of the country’s default in the event of a
rejection of the bailout. Foreign leaders in the eurozone, however, castigated
Papandreou for his bold proposal by arguing that it would jeopardize all
their efforts thus far. Moreover, politicians and law experts were not sure if
Greece could put the ongoing bailout through a referendum or whether the
referendum should be really about Greece exiting the eurozone or even the
EU. Most importantly the proposal for a referendum triggered fissures within
PASOK with another MP declaring her resignation from the parliamentary
caucus reducing PASOK’s representation to a hairsplitting majority of 152
MPs. Papandreou then abandoned the idea of the referendum and called
for a parliamentary vote of confidence in his government. His government
received 153 votes, including the one by Katseli who returned to the PASOK
caucus.
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Sensing that his government had reached its limit merely two years after
it was brought to power, Papandreou announced to president Karolos Papou-
lias his intention to form a wide coalition government. President Papoulias
coordinated the coalition talks by inviting the opposition parties. On the one
hand, Samaras, who had since revised his ambitious proposals in ‘Zappeio II’
and considered the pressure from his fellow leaders in the EPP to abandon
the politics of unqualified opposition, agreed to support a government un-
der the leadership of Lucas Papademos, a former vice-president of the ECB.
Apart from the cabinet portfolios received by ND, Samaras’ major payoff was
the promise that the duration of the coalition government would not be more
than six months and that elections would be held thereafter. Moreover, in
order to minimize the electoral cost associated with incumbency during times
of crisis (Nezi 2012), he asked from those ND MPs holding cabinet portfolios
to resign their seats. This way ND would not be technically a member of the
coalition government. This way Samaras hoped that his party would emerge
as the winner in the subsequent election either by commanding an outright
majority or as the senior partner in a coalition government. What escaped
from Samaras, however, was that blame attribution in the theory of economic
voting is not based on such technical details. For all intents and conse-
quences, ND was part of the Papademos coalition government. Karatzaferis,
on the other hand, placed fewer demands but insisted that the government
should contain as many politicians possible and only a limited number of
extra-parliamentary technocrats. In addition, Bakoyannis announced that
Democratic Alliance would support the Papademos government without a
formal or informal participation in the cabinet. The cabinet was particularly
big compared to its predecessors, with ND contributing two ministers, one
deputy-minister and three junior minister and LAOS with one minister, one
deputy-minister and two junior ministers, a considerable office payoff consid-
ering the small size of the party. Conservely to the Monti cabinet in Italy,
Papademos cabinet could only loosely be labelled as technocrat, however.
The ratio of six (including Papademos) out of 48 members was just slightly
higher than the four out of 36 in the first Papandreou cabinet, implying that
portfolios were allocated primarily on the basis of party considerations.
On 15 November the Papademos government passed an investiture vote
with 255 MPs in favour including the votes of PASOK, ND, LAOS and Demo-
cratic Alliance, and many dissenters from PASOK and ND who had resigned
the whip or otherwise expelled from the parliamentary caucuses. Once again,
two MPs of PASOK and Panos Kammenos from ND voted against the party
line and were expelled by the party leaders.
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Table 3: Voting patterns on the Papademos coalition government, November
2011.
Yes No Abstain Not present
PASOK 148 2 0 2
ND 83 1 0 1
SYRIZA 0 9 0 0
KKE 0 18 0 3
LAOS 16 0 0 0
Dem. Left 0 3 0 1
Dem. Alliance 4 0 0 0
Ind. ex-PASOK 2 5 0 0
Ind. ex-ND 2 0 0 0
Total 255 38 0 7
7 The vote on the second memorandum, Febru-
ary 2012
In the beginning of 2012 Papademos, having previously reached an agreement
with the PASOK, ND and LAOS leaders, negotiated the terms of a major
restructuring of the Greek debt which involved a face value writedown of 53%
through the Private Sector Involvement (PSI). The troika, however, did not
trust the commitment of the Greek government to stick to the conditionality
which accompanied the memorandum and requested for a new agreement to
be placed on a parliamentary vote. The second memorandum was associated
with severe budget cuts and tax hikes and when the terms were leaked to the
press, a snowball of resignations and exit from the Papademos government
ensued.
Amidst a new wave of protests, two PASOK ministers resigned, followed
by the resignation of all LAOS members of the cabinet. The latter orches-
trated the quick exit after spending less than two months in office as it
realized that the cost of incumbency was far greater than initially expected.
This was particularly true when the opinion polls suggested that the neo-
Nazi organization Golden Dawn could emerge as a serious competitor on
the immigration and nationalism dimension, threatening therefore the elec-
toral survival of LAOS. The vote for the second memorandum on February
presented once more voting instructions which tested the limits of party dis-
cipline. Both PASOK and, this time, ND instructed their MPs to vote in
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Table 4: Voting patterns on the second memorandum, February 2012.
Yes No Abstain Not present
PASOK 129 12 4 7
ND 63 20 0 1
SYRIZA 0 9 0 0
KKE 0 21 0 0
LAOS 2 0 0 14
Dem. Left 0 4 0 0
Dem. Alliance 3 1 0 0
Independent Greeks 0 2 0 0
Ind. ex-PASOK 0 6 0 0
Ind. ex-ND 2 0 0 0
Total 199 74 5 22
favour of the second memorandum. 22 PASOK MPs and 21 ND MPs voted
against the memorandum or abstained. Papandreou and Samaras expelled
all 43 of them within minutes from the conclusion of the procedure. Iron-
ically, Samaras expelled his MPs for exactly the opposite reason for which
he expelled Bakoyannis about two years before. Karatzaferis, instructed his
MPs not to be present for the voting but two of his former ministers showed
up and voted in favour of the memorandum. They were later resigned their
seats in a gentlemans’ agreement which enabled LAOS to replace them with
the next in the party list and subsequently joined ND. Nine of the MPs
expelled from ND joined Kammenos in a new party (Independent Greeks)
with a Eurosceptic profile bordering on conspiracy theory. Katseli, who was
expelled from PASOK for a second time in four months, led another new
party (Social Agreement) which included an additional eight expelled PA-
SOK MPs. From the remainder MPs expelled from PASOK, two joined
SYRIZA, six joined the Democratic Left, while Dimaras later negotiated a
place in the Independent Greeks ticket.
8 Conclusions
In contrast with other Southern European countries, as Italy and Portugal,
Greek political elites failed to achieve consensus regarding the economic cri-
sis. During the first years of the economic crisis the prime minister George
Papandreou looked like he was on the stage alone abandoned in several cases
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even by his own party. PASOK was the only party to support both the first
bailout package and the mid-term plan while most of the parties opposed
the austerity measures dictated by the eurozone and IMF. Whenever parties
in the opposition supported any of the bills associated with the austerity
measures only did so reluctantly, whereas their decision to do so was dic-
tated by strategic considerations regarding their goals. For Bakoyannis and
Democratic Alliance, such choices were dictated by the opposition to (what
they considered to be) Samaras’ populist trajectory. For Karatzaferis and
LAOS, the consensual choice was dictated by the need to present the image
of a responsible party which could take part in coalition talks as a credible
partner.
Consensus politics emerged at the first talks for a ‘national unity’ coali-
tion government. Nevertheless, these started only after the EU put pressure
on the Greek political parties, and especially ND, so as Greece to enact an
emergency funding package. The idea was that an oversized coalition govern-
ment would be needed in the case of MPs walking out of their parties in their
refusal to vote for unpopular austerity measures. The EU pressure aside, it
was clear that the coalition government was dictated less by the need to work
out a way out of the crisis and more as a tactical compromise regarding the
primary party goals: PASOK, which was interested in remaining in office,
agreed to enter the coalition negotiations only after it became clear (after the
narrow vote of confidence) that the resignations of its MPs would bring the
government down. ND accepted to enter the government reluctantly only
after important consessions, such as the agreement to call for an election
(thinking that ND would win it) in less than six months. Finally, for LAOS
it was the perfect opportunity to emerge as a credible party and shed the
image of the radical right outsider.
Nevertheless, the choices to support, or even become part of, the govern-
ment were quickly abandoned when parties realized how costly it was in terms
of votes. LAOS pulled out of the government within less than two months
while Samaras argued that, technically, ND was never part of the govern-
ment in the first place. The 2012 elections confirm this as PASOK and ND
suffered considerable losses: ND lost an additional 1,100,000 votes since 2009
and the 2009 election was already their worst performance since the party
was founded in 1974, while PASOK lost almost a double that amount and
finished third, a first since 1974. LAOS and Democratic Alliance were also
punished as they did not make it to the 3% threshold. Conversely, the op-
position that opposed the government, the troika and the austerity measures
in terms of an anti-capitalist, populist or conspiracy discourse were amply
rewarded. SYRIZA was catapulted from 4.6 to 16.78%, the neo-Nazi Golden
Dawn from 0.29 to 6.97% while Independent Greeks earned 10.61% far above
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what would be expected from a newcoming splinter party.
In contrast to Italy and the Monti government, the brief consensus poli-
tics that emerged during the coalition were unable to stabilize the financial
and political situation in Greece. Instead, they became the trigger which
imploded the cartel party system. Taking into account all party splits since
the 2009 election, the measure of effective number of parties at the legislative
level was raised to 4.17 from 2.59, which is the highest since 1951 let alone
1981 when the two-party system was consolidated. The May 2009 election
confirmed this implying that Greece might be experiencing a transition sim-
ilar to the one experienced by Italy in 1992–94. Similarly to Italy, however,
the electoral system provided the incentives for parties and voters to con-
verge around two poles: ND and SYRIZA. In the June 2012 election both of
these parties earned more than 10% each at the expense of smaller parties
such as Independent Greeks, LAOS, KKE and the Ecologist Greens. More-
over, Bakoyannis announced the suspension of Democratic Alliance and her
support for ND after Samaras offered her to head the party’s nationwide list
(which implies a seat in the parliament). It seems therefore that whatever
consensus politics emerged during the crisis could quite possibly lead, with
the help of an electoral system which awards a 50-seat bonus to the first
party, to a continuation of majoratarian politics under different party labels.
Table 5: Number of Effective Parties, 1981-2012.
Year EffNv EffNs Seats
1981 2.69 2.09 300
1985 2.58 2.15 300
1989 June 2.73 2.40 300
1989 Nov. 2.56 2.32 300
1990 2.63 2.37 300
1993 2.63 2.17 300
1996 3.07 2.36 300
2000 2.64 2.21 300
2004 2.66 2.19 300
2007 3.02 2.62 300
2009 3.16 2.59 300
2012 (Papademos gov.) - 4.17 300
2012 May 8.95 4.83 300
2012 June 5.20 3.76 300
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